










Since 1970, mixed-income (inclusionary) housing projects have proliferated in 
the United States.  In a community of this sort, only some of the dwelling units, 
perhaps as few as 10 to 25 percent, are targeted for delivery of housing assistance.  
Eligible households that successively occupy these particular units pay below-market 
rents, while the occupants of the other units do not.  This Article situates this 
innovation within the broader history of U.S. housing policy and evaluates its merits.  
I contend that the mixed-income project approach, while superior to the traditional 
public housing model, is in almost all contexts distinctly inferior to the provision of 
portable housing vouchers to needy tenants.  Although prior commentators also have 
touted the voucher approach, I enrich their analyses by addressing more fully the 
social consequences of various housing policies that might be used to economically 
integrate neighborhoods and buildings.  It has traditionally been thought that enhancing 
socioeconomic diversity within a neighborhood has unalloyed social benefits.  Many 
recent social-scientific studies present a more complex picture and weaken the case for 
government support of mixed-income projects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the United States, like most other 
developed nations, began to subsidize rents in housing projects entirely set 
aside for working-class (or even less prosperous) households.  By the 1980s, a 
broad consensus had emerged that the construction of these projects, tradition-
ally referred to as “public housing,” had been a policy blunder in many settings.  
Since that time, two primary alternative approaches have been competing for 
legislative blessing.  The first perpetuates the tradition of tying government 
aid to specific buildings, but reduces the percentage of aided units in a project 
from 100 percent to a lower figure, perhaps as little as 10 to 25 percent.  
Proponents of this “mixed-income,” or “inclusionary,” approach hope that it 
will mitigate the social pathologies that too often arise when children grow up 
amid the concentrated poverty prevalent in traditional public housing.  The 
second alternative approach calls for the provision of portable vouchers to tar-
geted households to better enable them to rent dwellings from private landlords. 
The voucher approach, the alternative typically advocated by housing 
economists, was ascendant in the United States in the mid-1990s.  Since then, 
however, more and more housing advocates and policymakers have endorsed 
the mixed-income approach.  As a result, mixed-income projects have sprouted 
across the country—most notably in metropolitan areas such as Boston, Chicago, 
and San Francisco—and already house hundreds of thousands of households. 
There are mammoth technical literatures on the particulars of both 
mixed-income housing programs and housing voucher programs.  Virtually all 
commentators who contributed to these literatures understandably regard both 
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of these strategies to be far superior to continuing to erect 100-percent-subsidized 
housing projects for poor families.  But which of the alternative paths of 
reform—mixed-income projects or housing vouchers—is the route better 
taken?  Or should both be pursued?  On those fundamental questions, commen-
tators have offered little guidance.  The balance to be struck between housing 
vouchers and mixed-income projects is a central question of urban policy.  
The choices made will profoundly influence the future prosperity and social 
vibrancy of American cities. 
In this Article, I contend that housing vouchers, in general, are far 
superior to mixed-income projects.  The heart of the Article is devoted to 
demonstrating that mixed-income developments share the inherent shortcom-
ings characteristic of other forms of project-based housing assistance.  A 
number of distinguished housing economists have previously identified many 
of these disadvantages.  My principal original contribution is to address more 
fully the social dimensions of alternative housing policies.  Many supporters 
of mixed-income projects implicitly assume that enhancing socioeconomic 
diversity within a neighborhood or building gives rise to large and unalloyed 
social benefits.  I contend that recent studies suggest that the benefits of social 
integration are seldom as great as advocates of mixed-income projects suppose.  
The high costs of producing these projects thus can rarely be justified on this 
basis.  Moreover, in many contexts, studies suggest that vouchers actually are 
the superior tool for promoting social integration.  These conclusions have many 
implications for housing policy.  In particular, they cast doubt on the merits 
of numerous programs to which many housing specialists currently devote 
their energies. 
I. SETTING THE STAGE 
To help readers who are not housing wonks comprehend the current 
debate between advocates of vouchers and of mixed-income projects, this Part 
briefly defines the basic policy choices and offers some pertinent history. 
A. The Basic Distinction Between Project-Based and Tenant-
Based Assistance 
The initial federal housing subsidy programs, such as public housing, were 
all project-based.  This method involves government financial aid to a public (or 
limited-profit) landlord to enable that landlord to lease dwelling units in specific 
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buildings at below-market rents to eligible households.1  A recipient tenant’s 
benefits typically are conditioned on continued residence in the dwelling 
assigned.  A tenant who moves out usually forfeits the subsidy benefits previ-
ously conferred, and those benefits are then transferred to a replacement 
tenant admitted from the landlord’s waiting list.  The benefit or subsidy is 
anchored to the unit, not the recipient tenant. 
In the United States, most housing subsidies continue to be project-based.  
About 1 percent of U.S. households currently reside in government-
managed assisted projects (public housing), and another 2 percent in assisted 
projects that are privately owned.2  These percentages are much lower than 
those of many European nations.  Subsidized rental projects account for 17 
percent of the total number of housing units in France (where these projects 
typically are referred to as habitation à loyer modéré or simply HLM), 22 percent 
in the United Kingdom (“council housing”), and 34 percent in the 
Netherlands (“sociale huurwoningen”).3 
The other basic government choice is tenant-based assistance, which 
operates on the demand side of the market for shelter.  Demand-side aid most 
commonly takes the form of government provision of housing vouchers to 
eligible householders.4  If and when a voucher recipient finds a private landlord 
willing to participate in the program, the tenant pays a set percentage of the 
household’s monthly cash income toward the monthly rent, and the gov-
ernment pays the remaining balance directly to the landlord.  Section 8, the 
principal voucher program in the United States, fixes the recipient’s share of 
the rent at 30 percent of monthly income.5  Housing vouchers typically are 
portable in the sense that the benefit travels with the recipient.  A tenant who 
moves elsewhere can, if the tenant’s new landlord is willing, apply the voucher 
                                                                                                                            
 1. To simplify, my analysis assumes that all aided units are rentals.  In fact, some mixed-
income and inclusionary programs entail the sale of dwellings at below-market prices, subject to 
resale controls.  See infra text accompanying notes 109–119 (describing the program of Montgomery 
County, Maryland). 
 2. See infra note 23 and text accompanying notes 26 and 43.  In 2007, there were approxi-
mately 116 million households in the United States.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009 tbl.58 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2008pubs/09statab/pop.pdf. 
 3. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Guidelines on Social Housing 15, fig. 1, U.N. Doc. ECE/HBP/137 
(2006) (providing estimates for c.2000), available at http://www.unece.org/hlm/prgm/hmm/social% 
20housing/ECE_HBP_137%20Social%20Housing%20final.pdf. 
 4. A government may prefer to distribute housing vouchers instead of unrestricted cash 
for a variety of reasons, including concerns about the welfare of children.  See Edgar O. Olsen, Housing 
Programs for Low-Income Households, in MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 365, 368–70 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2003).  For present purposes, I assume that the provision of 
in-kind housing benefits is justified and that it does not excessively foster dependency. 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (2006). 
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to reduce the tenant’s rent burden at the new dwelling.  Currently, about 2 
percent of U.S. households benefit from housing vouchers, a far smaller 
percentage than in, for example, France, where less generous vouchers are 
distributed as entitlements.6 
A nation’s decisions on the mixing of project-based and tenant-based 
housing aids affect the form of its metropolitan areas, the mobility of its 
households, and the welfare of its renters.  Vouchers are designed to give recipi-
ents more choices among the dwellings in the mammoth stock of existing 
housing.  Project subsidies, by contrast, attempt to influence the design and 
distribution of dwelling units in the relatively tiny flow of newly constructed 
and substantially rehabilitated buildings.7  
The quality of U.S. housing stock has improved markedly since the 
beginning of the twentieth century.8  Despite the relative stinginess of U.S. 
housing aid, U.S. housing compares favorably in quality, even at the low end, 
to that found abroad.  Members of American households in the bottom quintile 
of the national income distribution have 855 square feet of living area per 
capita.9  This is roughly double the per capita living area available to members 
of average-income households in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.10  
To the surprise of American tourists, many older seven-story apartment 
buildings in fashionable Paris neighborhoods lack elevators.  Dwellings are far 
more likely to be air conditioned in the U.S. than in France, where a 2003 
heat wave killed almost 15,000 persons.11  The average quality of American 
dwellings has risen over time because new housing tends to be higher in 
quality than existing housing and because Americans invest large sums to 
                                                                                                                            
 6. For the U.S. figure, see infra note 32 and accompanying text.  On France, see Anne 
Laferrére & David Le Blanc, Housing Policy: Low-Income Households in France, in A COMPANION 
TO URBAN ECONOMICS 159, 165 (Richard J. Arnott & Daniel P. McMillen eds., 2006).  Perhaps 
half of HLM tenants in France also receive housing allowances.  Id. 
 7. In a given year, the number of newly built dwellings in the U.S. rarely exceeds 2 percent 
of the existing residential stock. 
 8. EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: 
HOW TO MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 24–32 (2008); ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, 
HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 16–23 (2006). 
 9. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 8, at 28. 
 10. Id.  In France, 8 percent of two-person households live in less than fifty square meters 
of floor space.  U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Bulletin of Housing Statistics for Europe and North 
America tbl.A4 (2006), http://www.unece.org/hlm/prgm/hsstat/Bulletin_06.htm.  The comparable 
figure in the United States is 2 percent.  Id. 
 11. John Tagliabue, Lack of Air-Conditioning Cited in France’s Death Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
22, 2003, at A3; France Heat Wave Death Toll Set at 14,802, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 2003, available 
at http://www.usatoday.com/weather/news/2003-09-25-france-heat_x.htm.  In the U.S., 67 percent 
of year-round occupied housing units have central air-conditioning, and 23 percent have one or 
more room units.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, tbl.946. 
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improve existing dwellings.  The chief challenge for housing policymakers 
today is not how to improve the quality of American dwellings, but how to 
make existing dwellings more affordable to lower-income households.12 
B. A Brief History of the Evolution of U.S. Housing Assistance Policy 
Government housing policies have increasingly shaped the evolution of 
the housing stock.  A century ago, the poor immigrants who flooded into 
cities such as New York and Chicago commonly leased apartments in pri-
vately owned tenements.  Because these tenements often were crowded and 
unhealthy, many municipalities enacted building and housing codes to regulate 
conditions within them.  In that era, however, governments rarely appro-
priated funds for the provision of housing assistance.  The meager forms of aid 
provided typically were municipally financed.  A city, for example, might do 
no more than open shelters for vagrants in police stations and work with local 
charitable organizations to establish almshouses and asylums for a few of its 
neediest residents. 
Prior to 1937 the federal government seldom provided housing assis-
tance in any form, though the events of World War I prompted one notable 
exception.  The federal government then created and funded corporations to 
help house the workforces of shipbuilders involved in the war effort.13  The 
most renowned of these corporations’ projects was Yorkship Village in Camden, 
New Jersey, a community of about 1500 rental houses.14  However, this precedent 
was effectively repudiated in the early 1920s when the federal corporations 
auctioned off their developments.15 
By contrast, during the 1920s many European nations, with Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and Great Britain in the vanguard, built subsidized projects 
in numbers large enough to supplant much of the private supply of new rental 
housing.  Leading American housing reformers of the period, such as Edith 
Wood and Catherine Bauer, visited these developments, wrote glowingly about 
them, and chastised U.S. policymakers for continuing to rely so extensively on 
private enterprise to provide shelter for the masses.16  Because Wood and Bauer 
                                                                                                                            
 12. See JANET M. CURRIE, THE INVISIBLE SAFETY NET: PROTECTING THE NATION’S POOR 
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 97 (2006). 
 13. See Daniel Brook, Unnecessary Excellence: What Public-Housing Design Can Learn From 
Its Past, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Mar. 2005, at 76. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See CATHERINE BAUER, MODERN HOUSING (1934); EDITH ELMER WOOD, HOUSING 
PROGRESS IN WESTERN EUROPE (1923); EDITH ELMER WOOD, RECENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN 
HOUSING (1931) [hereinafter WOOD, RECENT TRENDS]. 
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both lacked confidence in market forces, they gave no thought to government 
provision of demand-side assistance to enable the same households to shop more 
successfully for existing dwellings. 
1. The Rise and Fall of Traditional Public Housing 
The shock of the Great Depression transformed American politics and 
eventually prompted lawmakers to emulate the European approach.  By the mid-
1930s both the state of New York and various New Deal agencies had begun 
to dabble in the development of subsidized housing estates.17  Persistent massive 
unemployment in the construction industry fueled political support for a far 
more ambitious effort.  In 1937 Congress passed the Wagner-Steagall Housing 
Act, launching a national program of public housing still in existence today.18  
Under the program, initially designed to primarily benefit working-class families, 
the federal government provides substantial subsidies to special local-government 
agencies called housing authorities.  This aid enables these authorities to develop 
and manage housing projects in which most rents are greatly reduced.19 
Nationwide, local housing authorities had constructed 420,000 public 
housing units by 1959.20  Even at this early stage, however, urban commentators 
such as Jane Jacobs had begun to assail the program.21  Critics especially targeted 
the largest high-rise projects, for example the 4500-unit Robert Taylor Homes 
in Chicago, which concentrated poor families in a socially destructive environ-
ment.22  As public housing for family households fell into disrepute, policymakers 
began searching for alternative ways to provide housing assistance to low-income 
renters.23  One eventual reform launched in 1992, the HOPE VI program, was 
                                                                                                                            
 17. See N.Y. City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936); K.C. Parsons, Clarence Stein 
and the Greenbelt Towns Settling for Less, 56 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 161 (1990). 
 18. Wagner-Steagall Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006)).  See generally H. PETER OBERLANDER & EVA NEWBRUN, 
HOUSER: THE LIFE AND WORK OF CATHERINE BAUER 130–56 (1999). 
 19. On the structure and evolution of the program, see Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal 
Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 894–99 (1990). 
 20. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 102 tbl.6.1. 
 21. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 321–37, 392–
402 (1961). 
 22. For an overview, see Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go 
From Here?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 497 (1993).  Many commentators have lauded the New York City 
Housing Authority’s efforts to prevent these sorts of concentrations. 
 23. Production of public housing continued, but with an increasing portion of units designed 
for the elderly.  The national stock of public housing peaked in 1993 at 1.4 million units, and by 
2004 it had declined to 1.2 million units as a result of the razing of some of the most troubled projects.  
SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 102. 
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itself designed to help housing authorities raze and redevelop distressed projects 
such as the Robert Taylor Homes.24 
2. The Profusion of Privately Developed Subsidized Projects 
As the dream of public housing began to fade in the late 1950s, federal 
housing-assistance policy splintered into an ever-changing panoply of programs 
(soon supplemented by state and local initiatives) whose specifics are obscure 
to all but an intrepid band of specialists.25  In contrast to the public housing 
model, most of these programs attempt to place assisted tenants in buildings 
owned and managed by private landlords, some of them nonprofit organizations.  
While the details of the programs vary, all are designed to funnel subsidy 
benefits to targeted low- and moderate-income households and to prevent 
project developers and owners from reaping undue profits.   
These diverse programs, and not public housing, are now the major source 
of new project-based housing aid.  By 1999, 1.5 million units of housing had been 
produced under the various private-owner, project-based subsidy programs that 
the federal government enacted between 1959 and 1984.26  Yet these programs 
generally were plagued by troublesome levels of inefficiency and corruption.  
When stung with embarrassing news about a program, Congress typically would 
repeal it and enact a new variation.  Beginning in the 1980s, Congress gradually 
shifted authority to approve developers’ applications for the funding of private 
subsidized projects from the federal department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) to state housing finance agencies.  Today these state 
entities are largely responsible for meting out low-interest mortgage loans and 
low-income housing tax credits, both of which are made possible, but also 
capped, by federal income tax statutes.27 
3. The Rise, and Fleeting Triumph, of Housing Vouchers 
Disillusionment with traditional public housing also helped spur support for 
a far more radical policy innovation—demand-side subsidies provided to lower-
                                                                                                                            
 24. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 25. Housing experts signal mastery of their field by dropping the names of these programs 
(for example 221(d)(3), Mitchell-Lama) into their conversations.  For a detailed overview of the 
various programs, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 8.  For brief and accessible introductions, see JOHN 
C. WEICHER, PRIVATIZING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 3–8 (1997) and Olsen, supra note 4, at 370–86. 
 26. See BIPARTISAN MILLENNIAL HOUS. COMM’N, MEETING OUR NATION’S HOUSING 
CHALLENGES 95, tbl.3 (2002), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mhc/MHCReport.pdf.  
The quoted figure excludes rural housing assistance. 
 27. See I.R.C. § 42 (2006) (low-income housing credit); id. § 142 (housing project bonds). 
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income households in the form of portable housing vouchers.  During the New 
Deal debates, skeptics of public housing commended vouchers as an alterna-
tive.28  The idea resurfaced in 1968 when the Kaiser Committee urged 
Congress to fund a voucher experiment, in part to investigate the extent to 
which the introduction of vouchers would inflate rents.29  Congress acqui-
esced, and the experiment was launched.30  In 1974 the auspicious early 
findings helped prompt Congress to enact Section 8, the federal housing 
voucher program.  With minor amendment, the program has been in place ever 
since.31  The federal government delegated responsibility for administering the 
vouchers largely to local housing authorities, the agencies initially estab-
lished to build public housing projects.  The number of households receiving 
Section 8 vouchers grew rapidly over the life of the program.  The total climbed 
to 600,000 by 1980 and to 2 million by 2005, making it by then the largest single 
branch of federal housing aid.32 
For a brief period, proponents of vouchers envisioned a more thoroughgoing 
triumph, namely the vouchering-out of existing subsidized projects and the 
shifting of all prospective housing aid to vouchers.  Between December 1994 
(just after the Republicans unexpectedly won control of both houses of 
Congress) and 1996, both the Clinton Administration and presidential candi-
date Robert Dole explored these possibilities.33  Writing during this period, Louis 
Winnick, one of the deans of American housing policy, stated: 
It is beyond doubt, and has been for some years, that the battle has gone 
substantially and seemingly permanently in favor of a household-
targeted strategy.  A paradigmatic shift has occurred.  Supply-siders, who 
reigned supreme during the life of government-assisted housing, are now 
relegated to the sidelines.34 
                                                                                                                            
 28. See Louis Winnick, The Triumph of Housing Allowance Programs: How a Fundamental 
Policy Conflict Was Resolved,  CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES., 1995 No. 3, at 95, 101–02. 
 29. PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON URBAN HOUS., A DECENT HOME 71–72 (1968). 
 30. See Olsen, supra note 4, at 424–27 (summarizing the many studies that emanated from this 
Experimental Housing Allowance Program). 
 31. After enactment of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-276, § 545, 112 Stat. 2461, 2596–2604 (1998), Section 8 benefits were formally named 
“Housing Choice Vouchers.” 
 32. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 153; Casey J. Dawkins, Income Targeting of Housing Vouchers: 
What Happened After the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act?, CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & 
RES., 2007 No. 3, at 69, 74 ex.1. 
 33. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD REINVENTION: FROM BLUEPRINT TO 
ACTION 7, 11 (1995); WEICHER, supra note 25, at 1. 
 34. Winnick, supra note 28, at 95. 
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But Winnick’s vision proved too optimistic, and the tide of support for 
vouchering-out soon ebbed.35  Since 1990, largely because of the influence of 
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (described below), the main increments 
in federal housing aid have thus been project-based.36 
4. The Emergence of Mixed-Income Projects 
This Article focuses on the shortcomings of one of the most popular 
project-based approaches—the subsidization of mixed-income affordable hous-
ing developments.  For present purposes, a housing project can be defined as 
“mixed-income” when: (1) a government subsidizes rents (or sales prices) in 
only a fraction of the project’s dwelling units; and (2) the aid is project-based—
that is, an aided household forfeits the benefit of the rent (or ownership) subsidy 
upon moving out.  My thesis, to reiterate, is that mixed-income projects share 
most of the shortcomings of other forms of project-based aid, and that portable 
housing aid is a superior policy approach in almost all settings. 
As a prelude to the presentation of these various shortcomings, I describe 
the genesis of the mixed-income project in the United States.  The seed was 
planted in the 1960s when the search for alternatives to conventional public 
housing was underway.  Since then, mixed-income projects have appeared in a 
wide variety of forms.  In rough chronological order, some seminal manifestations 
include: 
• The 1965 enactment of a short-lived federal leased housing 
program (Section 23) that authorized local housing authorities 
to lease specific units in private rental buildings.37 
• In the 1970s, adoption by a handful of wealthy suburbs of the 
first inclusionary zoning ordinances.  These typically required a 
housing developer to sell or rent, at below-market prices, 10 to 
20 percent of a project’s units to targeted households.38 
                                                                                                                            
 35. WEICHER, supra note 25, at 32–35. 
 36. Olsen, supra note 4, at 375. 
 37. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, § 103, 79 Stat. 451, 
455–57 (1965) (adding Section 23 to the U.S. Housing Act of 1937); see also Lawrence M. Friedman 
& James E. Krier, A New Lease on Life: Section 23 Housing and the Poor, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 611 (1968). 
 38. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary Zoning,” 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 
(1981) (describing the early evolution of this approach).  Valuable overviews of inclusionary programs 
include Douglas R. Porter, The Promise and Practice of Inclusionary Zoning, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT 
AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 212 (Anthony Downs ed., 2004), and Jenny 
Schuetz et al., 31 Flavors of Inclusionary Zoning: Comparing Policies From San Francisco, Washington, 
DC, and Suburban Boston, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 441 (2009).  Although a developer who sets aside 
inclusionary units nominally provides the subsidy, it is analytically appropriate to treat that outlay as 
both a choice and expenditure of the exacting government.  The exacting government could have 
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• The 1983 New Jersey Supreme Court holding, in the nationally 
conspicuous Mount Laurel II39 litigation, that a developer’s inclu-
sion of 20 percent affordable units in a development would help 
satisfy a municipality’s state constitutional obligations to poor 
New Jerseyans.40 
• Congressional authorization of the Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC) program in 1986.41  To receive the hefty tax 
credits that the program provides, a developer is required to set 
aside, currently for thirty years or more, at least 20 percent of 
project units as low-rent dwellings for qualifying households.  
Although the rules that govern LIHTCs allow for devel-
opments that are genuinely mixed-income, in practice more 
than 80 percent of LIHTC projects are entirely low-income.42  
As this program has matured, it has become private devel-
opers’ chief source of project-based subsidies.  By 2006 the 
LIHTC is estimated to have generated 1.6 million subsidized 
units, a total greater than the stock of public housing.43 
• In 1992, congressional enactment of HOPE VI, a program 
aimed (as mentioned) at inducing local housing authorities 
to replace failed public housing projects with mixed-income 
developments.44 
• A 1998 federal statute, aimed at deconcentrating poverty, that 
required local housing authorities to rent more public housing 
units to households whose incomes were not extremely low.45 
                                                                                                                            
conditioned its grant of development approval on the developer’s provision of some other kind of 
contribution.  But see infra note 62. 
 39. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 
(N.J. 1983). 
 40. Id. at 445–50. 
 41. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085, 2189–2208 (codified 
as amended at I.R.C. § 42 (2006)). 
 42. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 92. 
 43. Michael D. Eriksen, The Market Price of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, 66 J. URB. 
ECON. 141, 143 (2009); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 83 (placing the LIHTC total at 1.2 
million in 2003).  On the LIHTC generally, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 83–100, and David A. 
Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principal-Agent Problems, and Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 1823, 1850–
60 (2006). 
 44. Congress authorized the launch of HOPE VI in the Departments of Veterans Affairs and 
Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act 1993, Pub. L. No. 
102-389, tit. II, 106 Stat. 1571, 1579 (1992).  For discussion of the program’s evolution, see SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 8, at 117–23; Matthew H. Greene, The HOPE VI Paradox: Why Do HUD’s Most 
Successful Housing Developments Fail to Benefit the Poorest of the Poor, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 191 (2008). 
 45. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 513, 112 
Stat. 2461, 2544–45 (1998) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(a)(3) (2006)). 
994 57 UCLA LAW REVIEW 983 (2010) 
 
 
The concept of the mixed-income project has attracted support from 
many quarters.  Many urban policy specialists, aware of the social patholo-
gies associated with the early public housing projects, warm to the prospect of 
developments in which lower-class households mingle with middle-class role 
models.  Developers of assisted projects understandably anticipate that a local 
government is more likely to grant approval when a proposed project is mixed-
income rather than completely subsidized, partly because neighbors are less 
likely to object. 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, it was clear that political momen-
tum had shifted away from an all-voucher approach and toward a mixed-income 
project model.  In 1999, Congress established the Bipartisan Millennial Housing 
Commission.46  Ranking Republican and Democratic members of key congres-
sional subcommittees were authorized to appoint all twenty-two commissioners.  
They selected mostly individuals who had been significantly involved, from 
either the private or public side, in the production of subsidized projects.47  
The commission’s final report, issued in 2002, generally supported the preser-
vation of all types of existing subsidized projects and the construction of 
many more.48  The commission repeatedly endorsed the mixing of income 
groups in both projects and neighborhoods.49  While the report also backed the 
expansion of voucher programs, it stressed the limitations of this approach.50  In 
a section entitled “The Shrinking Rental Supply,” the commission estimated 
that during the next two decades, the production of five million additional 
“affordable units” (250,000 annually) would be necessary to “close the gap” 
between the number of extremely low-income households and the number of 
rental dwellings they would be able to afford.51  The commission proposed a new 
program of 100 percent capital subsidies to generate new projects in which 
extremely low-income households would compose roughly 20 percent of the 
tenants.52 
The Bipartisan Millennial Housing Commission’s proposal helped inspire 
the introduction of bills to establish a National Housing Trust Fund.  In October 
2007 the New York Times editorialized in favor of a pending bill that would have 
financed the construction, rehabilitation, and preservation of 1.5 million units 
of affordable housing over the next ten years, all of it mixed-income.53  Less than 
                                                                                                                            
 46. Pub. L. No. 106-74, § 206, 113 Stat. 1070–72 (1999). 
 47. BIPARTISAN MILLENNIAL HOUS. COMM’N, supra note 26, at iii–iv. 
 48. Id. at 27–70. 
 49. Id. at 3, 33, 39. 
 50. Id. at 18. 
 51. Id. at 17–18. 
 52. Id. at 37–39. 
 53. Editorial, A New Approach to Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at A20. 
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a year later, Congress took a small step in this direction.  The Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008, enacted largely in response to the sharp 
jump in the rate of home foreclosures, authorized the creation of a National 
Housing Trust Fund, albeit one much smaller and more targeted toward aiding 
the very poor than the version that the New York Times had supported.54 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s ten-year plan for the production of affordable 
housing in New York City between 2004 and 2013 further demonstrates the 
revival of political support for project-based assistance.55  Mayor Bloomberg’s 
plan contemplates both the production of 92,000 new affordable housing 
units in the city and preservation efforts targeted at 73,000 of the city’s 250,000 
currently subsidized private-project units.  Mayor Bloomberg calls this “the largest 
municipal affordable housing effort in the nation’s history.”56  Parts of the 
Bloomberg plan explicitly encourage mixed-income developments, as do other 
long-standing New York City programs.57 
II. THE SUPERIORITY OF HOUSING VOUCHERS 
Like Mayor Bloomberg and the members of the Millennial Commission, 
most law review commentators have regarded project-based subsidies to be a 
defensible branch of housing assistance.58  By contrast, most housing economists 
who have addressed the issue assert that, as a general matter, portable tenant-
based subsidies are markedly more efficient and fairer than project-based 
subsidies.59  Some of these scholars, notably Edgar Olsen and John Weicher, 
have urged governments to refrain from authorizing the construction of more 
                                                                                                                            
 54. See Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 1338, 122 Stat. 2654, 2712–23 (2008); see also Peter W. Salsich, 
National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Legislation: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis Also Hits Renters, 16 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 11 (2009) (praising creation of the Fund). 
 55. See N.Y. CITY, DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. AND DEV., THE NEW HOUSING MARKETPLACE: 
CREATING HOUSING FOR THE NEXT GENERATION (2005), http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/ 
pdf/10yearHMplan.pdf.  The State and City of New York have long had a distinctive and unusually 
ambitious array of housing assistance programs.  See PETER SALINS & GERARD C.S. MILDNER, 
SCARCITY BY DESIGN: THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING POLICIES (1992); Ingrid 
Gould Ellen & Brendan O’Flaherty, How New York Housing Policies Are Different—and Maybe Why 
(Nov. 20, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
 56. N.Y. CITY, DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. AND DEV., supra note 55, at 3. 
 57. See id. at 12.  The New York legislature has authorized the City, for example, to confer 421-a 
property tax abatements on builders of Manhattan high-rises who are willing to provide funding for mixed-
income housing projects.  See Seth B. Cohen, Note, Teaching an Old Policy New Tricks: The 421-a 
Tax Program and the Flaws of Trickle-Down Housing, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 757 (2008). 
 58. See, e.g., Salsich, supra note 54.  Some dissenters are identified infra note 60. 
 59. Despite the general superiority of vouchers, project subsidies may be advisable in a narrow 
set of circumstances, such as to provide supportive-care facilities for the homeless, see CURRIE, supra 
note 12, at 108–09, and to house workers at remote bases where national security considerations warrant 
secrecy in housing supply. 
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subsidized projects and to voucher out existing ones.60  Compared to vouchers, 
project-based subsidies have a variety of shortcomings, some well-ventilated 
in the literature, others not. 
A. The Inefficiencies of Project-Based Aid 
Consider a hypothetical mixed-income project, Evergreen Woods, that 
a developer proposes to build at a suburban site.  The development will consist 
of several multifamily structures comprising a total of fifty uniformly sized and 
equipped two-bedroom units.61  The developer anticipates being able to rent the 
market-rate units at $1500 per month.  As a condition for obtaining the subur-
ban government’s approval, the developer has agreed to rent ten specific units 
(out of the total of fifty) to tenants with incomes below a certain ceiling.  These 
tenants will pay 30 percent of their income toward rent.  The average monthly 
income of these subsidized tenants is expected to be $2000 (well below the 
incomes of most actual beneficiaries of inclusionary units in practice).  The 
developer thus will collect, per inclusionary unit, an average of $600 (30 percent 
of $2000) of rent per month.   
To the developer, this subsidy is the rough equivalent of a tax of $900 per 
month per affordable unit.  The municipality essentially sacrifices revenue of that 
amount to pursue its inclusionary program (assuming that it could instead exact 
from the developer general revenue in an amount equivalent to the devel-
oper’s loss).62  The various benefits of the program, however, are likely to be far 
less than $900 per month. 
                                                                                                                            
 60. See WEICHER, supra note 25, at 12–31; Edgar O. Olsen, Achieving Fundamental Housing 
Policy Reform, in PROMOTING THE GENERAL WELFARE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT 
PERFORMANCE 100 (Alan S. Gerber & Eric M. Patashnik eds., 2006); Olsen, supra note 4, at 427–
37; John Weicher, The Voucher/Production Debate, in BUILDING FOUNDATIONS: HOUSING AND 
FEDERAL POLICY (Denise DiPasquale & Langley C. Keyes eds., 1990). 
Other pro-voucher economists include, in rough chronological order of their contributions, Ira 
Lowry, Louis Winnick, Stephen Mayo, Stephen Malpezzi, Janet Currie, see CURRIE, supra note 12, 
at 90–112, and Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko, see GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 8, at 
115–18, 132–36.  In the legal literature, works touting the superiority of vouchers include Stephen 
B. Kinnaird, Public Housing: Abandon HOPE, But Not Privatization, 103 YALE L.J. 961 (1994); 
Schill, supra note 22; and Weisbach, supra note 43. 
 61. Many governments with inclusionary programs authorize developers to downgrade, perhaps 
even drastically, the interior amenities of inclusionary units.  To simplify the exposition, the developer 
of Evergreen Woods is assumed to not have this option. 
 62. On the contested plausibility of this assumption, see sources cited in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON 
& VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 650–51 (3d ed. 2005). 
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1. Higher Production Costs 
Most studies of supply costs have focused on projects in which all units are 
subsidized, not just some as in Evergreen Woods.  Housing economists have 
consistently found that, all else equal, the development of housing units in subsi-
dized projects, whether publicly or privately sponsored, costs significantly 
more than the development of unsubsidized units.  Developers and funding 
governments typically spend an average of about $1.60 (although perhaps as 
little as $1.20) to produce $1.00 of rental value63 (which, as we shall soon see, is 
itself likely to exceed the value to the occupying tenant).  By contrast, a gov-
ernment may need to spend as little as $1.10 to transfer $1.00 in voucher aid 
to a tenant.64 
A subsidized project inherently requires extra time and effort from both 
the developer and public officials.  In most cases, the developer seeks gov-
ernment subsidies and must apply to one or more government agencies to get 
them.  Especially since the advent of the LIHTC in 1986, developers commonly 
stack different project-based subsidies on top of one another, adding more com-
plexity to application processes.  The LIHTC, currently the core project-subsidy 
financing mechanism, is especially fraught with transaction costs.  A developer 
who is awarded LIHTCs typically sells them to a syndicator, who, on account 
of the complexities of the program, will only buy them at a discount.  The 
syndicator then sells interests in a pool of credits to third-party investors.  Syndi-
cators typically charge fees of between 6 and 15 percent for the services they 
provide.65  It has been estimated that the developer receives, in the end, only 
$0.73 per $1.00 of tax credit sold.66   
In addition, news that a developer is proposing a subsidized project, even 
a partial one, is likely to spark an unusual amount of concern on the part of 
homeowners located near the proposed site.  As a result, a developer typically 
                                                                                                                            
 63. For summaries of the various studies, see Stephen K. Mayo, Sources of Inefficiency in 
Subsidized Housing Programs, 20 J. URB. ECON. 229 (1986), and Olsen, supra note 4, at 394–99.  
See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-76, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE: COMPARING 
THE CHARACTERISTICS AND COSTS OF HOUSING PROGRAMS 43–45, 17–23 (2002); infra note 167.  
A number of professional housers and planners have challenged the economists’ consensus.  For a 
review of the works of these dissenters, see Lan Deng, The Cost-Effectiveness of the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit Relative to Vouchers: Evidence From Six Metropolitan Areas, 16 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 469, 472–77 (2005).  Applying her own methodology, Deng concludes that vouchers indeed 
are cheaper than LIHTC projects in most metropolitan areas, but perhaps not in all.  Her methodol-
ogy, like most others’, does not take into account the lock-in effects of project-based housing subsidies, 
one of the basic sources of their inefficiency. 
 64. Mayo, supra note 63, at 242–47. 
 65. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 85–87 (between 6 and 10 percent); Eriksen, supra note 43, 
at 148 (in excess of 15 percent). 
 66. Eriksen, supra note 43, at 148. 
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must spend extra time and effort to obtain land use permits from the local 
government.  It is plausible that these various pursuits for permits are associ-
ated with efficiencies of scale.67  If so, when a subsidized project resembles 
Evergreen Woods, where only 20 percent of the dwellings are to be set aside as 
affordable, the incremental private and public processing costs per subsidized 
unit can be expected to be unusually high.  If government housing aid were 
provided solely through vouchers, most of these extra costs of securing permits 
and tax credits would be avoided. 
Waste from rent seeking also tends to be greater under project-based 
subsidy programs.  For example, state housing finance agencies receive about 
three times more applications for LIHTCs than they can grant.68  To improve 
their prospects for obtaining approvals, developers may invest in political con-
nections, a practice that dissipates some of the rents being sought and also 
corrupts the electoral process. 
2. Slack Arising From the Absence of Market Discipline 
The developer’s incentive to efficiently produce and maintain the ten 
subsidized units at Evergreen Woods plummets as soon as those units are 
earmarked as aided dwellings.  Because of the generosity of the rent discounts, 
the developer knows that the queue will be long and that finding tenants for the 
inclusionary units will be a snap.  During construction, the developer’s execu-
tives therefore may be tempted to cut corners.  For example, they might tell 
their superintendents to only casually supervise the work of the subcontractor 
hired to paint the interiors of the subsidized units.  Similarly, once tenants have 
moved into the subsidized dwellings, the developer/owner has less incentive to 
attend to their complaints, say about the crankiness of the heating system.  
Given the bargain rent, a subsidized tenant cannot credibly threaten to vacate 
to protest the owner’s failure to make cost-justified repairs.  Even if the tenant 
did decide to forfeit the subsidy and vacate the unit, the developer could readily 
find a replacement from the queue.  As John Weicher elegantly puts it, the 
principal party that the developer of a subsidized project must please is not 
the tenant but the government agency that supervises the program.69 
When housing aid takes the form of vouchers, these perverse incentives are 
much reduced, if not eliminated altogether.  Suppose a tenant with a portable 
$900 per month housing voucher had rented an ordinary $1500 per month 
                                                                                                                            
 67. There appear to have been no empirical studies on this issue. 
 68. Olsen, supra note 4, at 397. 
 69. WEICHER, supra note 25, at 6. 
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unit at Evergreen Woods.  This tenant possesses the same power as a market-
paying renter to credibly threaten to leave, and might be similarly hard to 
replace.  The developer/owner would then have reason to worry about the 
quality of the initial interior paint job and about the tenant’s complaints about 
the heating system.  Vouchers, unlike project-based subsidies, thus impose a 
market discipline that helps pressure building owners to implement maintenance 
measures that are cost-justified. 
3. Mismatches Between Assisted Households and the Housing Units 
They Occupy 
A project-based subsidy program is likely to be far inferior to a voucher 
program in placing assisted tenants in dwellings whose locations and designs 
suit their preferences.70  Recall the initial assumption that each of the households 
that applies for one of the ten subsidized two-bedroom units in Evergreen 
Woods earns a fixed income of $2000 per month and thus would pay rent of 
$600 per month if selected by lottery or queue.  Further, assume that half of the 
applicants are high-valuing tenants who value occupancy of one of these 
dwellings at $1400 per month, while the other half are low-valuing tenants 
who regard them as worth only $700 per month.  (Given their budget 
constraints, it is unlikely that any of the applicants would bid $1500 to live at 
Evergreen Woods.71)  A tenant might be low-valuing because of reservations, 
for example, about the location of Evergreen Woods, the layout of its units, or 
the suitability of a two-bedroom unit for the tenant’s household as the tenant 
expects it to evolve.  If selected, a high-valuing tenant who moved into the 
development would garner $800 per month in consumer surplus, whereas a 
low-valuing tenant would garner $100 per month.  If tenants were empowered 
to transfer occupancy rights in a subsidized unit to another eligible household, 
one would expect a low-valuing tenant who had been awarded a unit to transfer 
it to a high-valuing tenant, with the two parties somehow divvying up the $700 
per month in increased surplus.  The regulations that govern project-subsidy 
programs, however, almost invariably forbid a tenant from transferring occu-
pancy rights.  This is necessary to prevent a recipient household from converting 
the discounted value of the housing subsidy to a lump sum of cash, an act that 
                                                                                                                            
 70. The housing economists who criticize project-based subsidies seldom stress this shortcom-
ing.  But cf. Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control, 
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1027 (2003) (identifying the mismatch problem as an additional and under-
acknowledged inefficiency of rent controls). 
 71. These valuations of alternative locations are those that tenants would hypothetically assign 
after they had been designated beneficiaries of $600 per month rents at Evergreen Woods. 
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would frustrate the program designers’ paternalistic aim of inducing program 
beneficiaries to consume more housing rather than other goods and services. 
This stylized example points to the mismatches between tenants and 
housing units that are likely to occur under any sort of project-subsidy program.  
Given the assumptions, if the households selected to live in inclusionary units 
at Evergreen Woods were randomly chosen, as many as half of them might 
be low-valuing tenants.  Although low-valuing tenants might be less likely to 
move in if accepted, they still would have an incentive to do so, especially if 
there were many names on the application lists for projects.  Whenever a low-
valuing rather than a high-valuing tenant moves into Evergreen Woods, 
there is a deadweight loss of $700 per month in consumer surplus.72 
In addition, as the years pass, aggregate deadweight losses are likely to 
increase.  Although some households increasingly value a dwelling as they put 
down roots in it, the passage of time more typically has the opposite effect.73  In 
a given year, about one-third of U.S. tenant households move to new quarters, 
primarily to accommodate changes in either their employment situation or the 
composition of their household.74  Suppose that one of the long-term subsidized 
tenants at Evergreen Woods is a divorcee who originally moved in when her 
child was an infant.  Recently, she has taken a new job that requires a lengthy 
commute.  She also would like to invite her infirm and lonely father to move in 
with her, but she doesn’t think a two-bedroom unit is big enough to accom-
modate that arrangement.  Once a high-valuing tenant at Evergreen Woods, 
she has become a low-valuing one.  If she were to have had the benefit of a 
$900 per month housing voucher, she would have moved long ago to another 
dwelling more suited to her altered life circumstances. 
In sum, project-based housing subsidies tend to have lock-in effects that are 
likely to worsen as a project ages.  These hamper tenants’ abilities to better 
match themselves with, among other things, a job, a dwelling, and a set of 
                                                                                                                            
 72. Between 1965 and 1979, the headiest era of empirical research on housing assistance policy, 
a number of economists published studies, mostly of public housing, that attempted to measure the 
equivalent variation.  This is the ratio between the assisted tenants’ actual mean benefits (in the 
example used in the text, $800 per month for a high-valuing tenant and $100 per month for a low-
valuing one), and the mean nominal subsidy ($900/month in the example).  The reported ratios ranged 
from 0.61 to 0.92.  See Olsen, supra note 4, at 417 tbl.6.17. 
 73. See Glaeser & Luttmer, supra note 70, at 1042–43 (finding that the apartments of long-
term rent-controlled tenants are especially misallocated). 
 74. JASON SCHACHTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P23-204, 
WHY PEOPLE MOVE: EXPLORING THE MARCH 2000 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 2 tbl.1 (2001); 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1999, at 210–13 
tbl.4-11 (2003). 
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housemates.75  Most tenants understandably prefer greater freedom of movement.  
In a survey of New Orleans public housing tenants displaced by Hurricane 
Katrina, respondents were almost twice as likely to state that they would prefer 
to receive a housing voucher than to return to their former project.76  Americans 
move at almost twice the annual rate of, say, the British and French.77  The 
much lower incidence of project-based housing assistance in the U.S. is a major 
cause of this difference.78 
4. Do Subsidized Projects Generate Positive Externalities? 
Viewed from a broader social perspective, however, a program that creates 
detrimental housing lock-ins may nevertheless be justified by the offsetting 
beneficial social externalities that the program generates.79  According to some 
studies, the construction of a subsidized housing project may raise the value of 
surrounding properties.80  For several reasons, however, the possibility of these 
positive effects is unlikely, by itself, to justify government subsidies to housing 
projects.  In most housing markets, the construction of subsidized projects 
tends to lessen production of unsubsidized projects that are likely to have similar 
positive spillover effects.81  In addition, a city that wants to renew a particu-
lar neighborhood has many more direct means of doing so.  These include 
concentrated code enforcement, improvements to streetscapes, grants for facade 
improvements, and the erection of schools, libraries, and other public edifices. 
                                                                                                                            
 75. See Robert C. Ellickson, Legal Constraints on Household Moves: Should Footloose Americans 
Envy the Rooted French? (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 390, 2009), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1445603.  
 76. Most New Orleans Residents Want to Return, But Not to Public Housing Units, According to 
HANO Survey, 36 HOUSING & DEV. REP. 201 (2008). 
 77. Larry Long, Residential Mobility Differences Among Developed Countries, 14 INT’L REGIONAL 
SCI. REV. 133, 136 tbl.1 (1991). 
 78. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 75, at 20–23; Gordon Hughes & Barry McCormick, Do 
Council Housing Policies Reduce Migration Between Regions?, 91 ECON. J. 919 (1981).  In 2004, 52 
percent of American public housing tenants had been in their present units for five years or more, 
compared to 36 percent of Section 8 tenants.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 107 tbl.6.4, 159 tbl.8.5.  
Because the rents of 70 percent of New York City tenants are regulated either by some form of rent 
control or project-subsidy rule, tenants there are relatively immobile.  From 1990 to 2000, 35 percent 
of the city’s tenants remained in the same dwellings, compared to 17 percent of Chicago’s.  See Ellen 
& O’Flaherty, supra note 55, tbls.7.1, 7.11. 
 79. Ellen and O’Flaherty speculate that the New York City policies that lock in tenants might 
be motivated by a desire to augment social capital and generate positive production externalities.  
Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 55, at 34–43. 
 80. See Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Does Federally Subsidized Rental Housing Depress Neighborhood 
Property Values?, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 257 (2007); Amy Ellen Schwartz et al., The External 
Effects of Place-Based Subsidized Housing, 36 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 679 (2006). 
 81. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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Nevertheless, project-based subsidies may indeed have some beneficial 
social effects.  A locked-in tenant has valuable property rights in a particular 
dwelling and therefore a greater incentive to be active in local politics.  This can 
be presumed to be a socially desirable result.82  A locked-in tenant also can more 
credibly represent to an employer that she is not a fly-by-night worker.  This may 
induce the employer, for example, to invest more in training her.83  Some adoles-
cents suffer from repeated changes of residence,84 an effect that some caretakers 
may inadequately weigh.  More generally, when the residents of a neighborhood 
move less often, they possibly amass more neighborhood social capital and 
thereby become more trustworthy in their dealings with one another.85 
Housing lock-ins, however, also can generate negative social externalities 
that might more than completely offset these positive ones.86  The freezing of 
households in place may prevent a person from migrating to a more dynamic 
employment environment, and from creating valuable bridging social ties with 
the members of other population groups.87  In particular, housing lock-ins tend 
to worsen landlord-tenant relations.88  When the threat of unilateral termina-
tion by either party hangs over a residential landlord-tenant relationship, both 
sides have a strong incentive to cooperate with one another.  Under these 
circumstances, even arms-length landlord-tenant relations tend to be com-
fortable, at least during the midgame of the lease.  However, when a tenant and 
landlord are locked in because of either project-based aid or rent controls, 
the dynamic changes.  The landlord then tends to be relatively unresponsive 
to the tenant’s complaints, and the tenant has less reason to act civilly toward 
the landlord.  In New York City, where both project subsidies and rent controls 
have led to an extraordinary level of lock-ins, there is a special housing court 
that averages 300,000 new cases per year, and the media periodically describe 
                                                                                                                            
 82. Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 55, at 40. 
 83. Cf. Jakob Roland Munch et al., Home Ownership, Job Duration, and Wages, 63 J. URB. 
ECON. 130 (2008). 
 84. Emma K. Adam & P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Home Sweet Home(s): Parental Separations, 
Residential Moves, and Adjustment Problems in Low-Income Adolescent Girls, 38 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 792 (2002).  But cf. Shana Pribesh & Douglas B. Downey, Why Are Residential and School 
Moves Associated With Poor School Performance?, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 521 (1999) (attributing these 
negative effects mostly to the attributes of the children’s caretakers). 
 85. See Ellickson, supra note 75, at 30–31; cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 
15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986) (defending rent control as a means of protecting social ties within 
a community). 
 86. At present, little is known about the magnitude of either the positive or negative externalities. 
 87. See, e.g., Holger Bonin et al., Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising Its 
Economic and Social Benefits 51–52 (IZA Research Report No. 19, July 2008) (urging European nations 
to encourage migration). 
 88. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH 
126–27 (2008). 
Mixed-Income Housing Projects 1003 
 
 
multiyear wars between particular landlords and tenants.89  And the state of New 
York, a center of project-based subsidized housing, has one of the lowest levels 
of social capital outside the South.90  These facts suggest that housing lock-ins 
may actually lower, not raise, trust and trustworthiness among members of the 
affected population. 
B. The Relative Unfairness of Project-Based Aid 
Those who favor jettisoning project-based aid in favor of portable vouchers 
also marshal a potent array of fairness arguments.  They assert that tenant-based 
aid can be more easily structured to treat like households alike (the goal of hori-
zontal equity) and to funnel benefits to the most impoverished households (the 
goal of vertical equity). 
1. Horizontal Equity 
In the United States, a housing subsidy is the only major form of means-
tested aid that is not made available as an entitlement to every household 
that satisfies the stated criteria for eligibility.  Only about 30 percent of qualified 
renters with incomes below the federal poverty threshold benefit from any 
sort of federal housing aid.91  The high cost of housing subsidies compared to 
most other forms of means-tested aid is a primary reason that housing subsidies 
are not entitlements.  The federal government incurs costs of roughly $500 per 
month for each tenant household that it assists.92  By contrast, a person who is 
eligible, for example, for food stamps or disability benefits, is never denied aid 
on the ground that Congress has not appropriated sufficient funds. 
The households that benefit from housing assistance tend to be headed by 
individuals who have been either adroit or lucky in navigating the queues and 
lotteries that housing agencies and developers employ to mete out aid.  The 
Section 8 voucher program generates some of the longest queues.  The Los 
Angeles Housing Authority, which provides portable vouchers to around 45,000 
                                                                                                                            
 89. N.Y. State Unified Court System, N.Y. City Civil Court Housing Part, http://www.nycourts. 
gov/courts/nyc/housing/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2010); see also, e.g., Ron Stodghill, A House 
Divided: Uncivil War on E. 73rd., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006, § 3 at 1. 
 90. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 298 fig.81 (2000). 
 91. Olsen, supra note 4, at 394. 
 92. Computed from U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-901R, FEDERAL HOUSING 
PROGRAMS: WHAT THEY COST AND WHAT THEY PROVIDE 1 (2001). 
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households, in 1999 had 342,000 households on its waiting list.93  Many project-
subsidy programs also attract far more applicants than can be served.  When 
news spreads that a private project in a prime location will include some 
affordable units, applicants may exceed the number of available units by a mul-
tiple of one hundred.94  And little wonder: a New York Times article reported 
that a thirty-two-year-old aspiring novelist won a lottery that enabled him to 
buy, for $14,000 in cash and a monthly maintenance fee of $295, a studio 
co-op apartment in a fashionable neighborhood of Manhattan.95  In that 
instance, the market price of a comparable unit would have been perhaps 
twenty times greater.96  The fact that all other major welfare programs are 
designed to avoid these sorts of haphazard outcomes highlights the gravity of 
the horizontal inequity of all current methods of housing assistance. 
Janet Currie pinpoints the lottery aspect of housing assistance as its 
principal defect.97  To address this problem, and that of vertical equity as well, 
Edgar Olsen has recommended that all current federal spending on project 
assistance be converted to additional funding for housing vouchers, to which 
every eligible needy household would be entitled without having to wait in a 
queue.98  In the absence of an increase in total federal appropriations, this reform 
would require a substantial reduction in the amount of housing aid per recipient 
from the current level of about $500 per month. 
2. Vertical Equity 
Most analysts urge that means-tested transfers be directed primarily to the 
poorest households—those most likely to be living in substandard housing and 
to be overburdened by rent obligations.  Many means-tested benefits are so tar-
geted.  To qualify for food stamps, for example, a household’s income typically 
must be less than 130 percent of the applicable federal poverty threshold.99 
Much federal housing assistance, however, is conferred on households 
with considerably higher incomes.100  Judged by the criterion of vertical equity, 
vouchers are far superior to project-based housing aids, partly because vouchers 
                                                                                                                            
 93. Olsen, supra note 4, at 394 n.28, Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Section 8 
Housing, http://www.hacla.org/section8 (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
 94. Vivian S. Toy, Winning That One in a Million, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at RE1. 
 95. Susan Dominus, A Co-op for $14,000?  It’s No Fiction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at B1.   
 96. The co-op in question was located in a building on 88th Street near Third Avenue.  Id.  See 
generally Toy, supra note 94 (describing the depth of purchasers’ subsidies). 
 97. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 94. 
 98. Olsen, supra note 60, at 109–12; Olsen, supra note 4, at 437. 
 99. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c)(2) (2006). 
 100. Olsen, supra note 4, at 393. 
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are easier to target.  In 1998, Congress required local housing authorities to award 
at least 75 percent of vouchers to households whose incomes were below 30 
percent of the median income in their metropolitan area (a ceiling roughly equal 
to the official poverty threshold).101  By 2005, 78 percent of housing voucher 
holders indeed had incomes below 30 percent of the area median.102  In contrast, 
partly to avoid concentrations of poverty in public housing projects, the same 
1998 statute required that only 40 percent of the units in federally subsi-
dized projects be allocated to households below 30 percent of the area median.103 
When measured by the vertical equity yardstick, most mixed-income 
affordable housing programs fall especially short.  The developer of an LIHTC 
project, for example, can legally rent a low-income unit to any household 
with an income less than 50 percent of the area median.  This income ceiling 
is two-thirds higher than the one applicable to the households favored under 
the federal voucher program.  The developers of many LIHTC projects in fact 
aim for an even more prosperous tenantry.104   
Additionally, scholars who have evaluated inclusionary efforts in New 
Jersey, which were prompted in large part by the Mount Laurel decisions and 
the state’s Fair Housing Act, have found less social integration than proponents 
of these efforts had hoped for.  Most of the beneficiaries of the suburban New 
Jersey projects were themselves suburbanites, principally elderly white women.105  
Relatively few were African American.106 
The distributive effects of inclusionary zoning programs in other jurisdic-
tions are similarly suspect.  Roughly half of the local governments in the Boston 
and San Francisco metropolitan areas have adopted some sort of inclusionary 
program, as have the great majority of the counties and cities in the 
Washington, D.C. area.107  Most agencies that administer these programs release 
little or no information about the characteristics of the households that occupy 
                                                                                                                            
 101. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-276, § 513(a), 112 
Stat. 2461, 2545 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(b)(1) (2006)). 
 102. Dawkins, supra note 32, at 76. 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(a) (2006). 
 104. Shilesh Muralidhara, Deficiencies of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit in Targeting the 
Lowest-Income Households and in Promoting Concentrated Poverty and Segregation, 24 LAW & INEQ. 
353, 358–64 (2006).  In addition, the rent that a subsidized LIHTC tenant pays does not vary with 
the tenant’s income.  As a result, the poorest applicants for subsidized LIHTC units may face prospec-
tive rent burdens far in excess of 30 percent of income.  Id. at 359.  By stacking other subsidies on top 
of the tax credits, however, some developers of LIHTC projects are able to accommodate households 
whose incomes are near the poverty threshold. 
 105. Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis 
of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268, 1305 (1997). 
 106. Id. at 1302–05; see also Porter, supra note 38, at 244–45 (stating that inclusionary programs 
do little to relocate poor and minority households from inner cities to suburbs). 
 107. Schuetz et al., supra note 38, at 444–46. 
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their inclusionary units.  It is nonetheless plain that the vast majority of the 
beneficiaries are solidly middle class.  Many of these suburbs make at least some 
inclusionary units available to households with incomes up to 120 percent of the 
area median, and most make them available to those with incomes up to 80 
percent of the median.108  Again, for comparison, the incomes of most holders 
of Section 8 vouchers fall below 30 percent of the area median. 
Montgomery County, Maryland administers one of the largest and most 
transparent inclusionary programs in the United States.109  Montgomery County’s 
program is structured to deliver inclusionary units to households whose incomes 
are 70 percent or less of the area median when they move in, a ceiling well 
above the poverty threshold.  The county establishes a fixed rent (or sale 
price) for each inclusionary unit rather than calculating rent as a percentage 
of income.110  The formulas used by the county to determine the reduced rents 
and sale prices assure that subsidies are not deep enough to make the units 
affordable by the truly needy.  For example, in 2008, the developer of an 
inclusionary two-bedroom unit in a low-rise apartment building might be 
entitled to charge a household of three a rent of $1200 per month (not 
including utilities).111  A Montgomery County report issued in 2007 confirms 
that the county’s inclusionary program primarily serves households whose 
incomes at time of entry are between 60 and 70 percent of the area median—
that is, just below ceiling for eligibility.112  New beneficiaries in 2008 thus 
would mostly have had annual incomes in the $60,000 to $70,000 range.113   
Moreover, Montgomery County does not ask a benefited household to 
report changes in income after it has moved into an inclusionary unit.114  The 
                                                                                                                            
 108. Id. at 448.  Administrators of housing programs typically refer to households in these 
respective groups as “moderate-income” and “low-income.”  The programs of the Washington, D.C. 
suburbs generally are targeted at households with somewhat lower incomes, typically those below 70 
percent of the area median.  Id. 
 109. For information about the program, see Montgomery County, Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs, Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) Program, http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/ 
dhctmpl.asp?url=/Content/DHCA/housing/housing_P/mpdu.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).  For an 
overview, see LESLIE RUBIN & ARON TROMBKA, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY, A STUDY OF MODERATELY PRICED DWELLING UNIT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, NO. 
2007-9  (2007). 
 110. RUBIN & TROMBKA, supra note 109, at 39–41, 45–46. 
 111. Calculated according to formulas set out in MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE REGS. 
§§ 25A.00.02.02, .05 (2003). 
 112. RUBIN & TROMBKA, supra note 109, at 5. 
 113. In 2009 HUD’s official estimate of the median annual income of a family in the Washington, 
D.C., PMSA was $102,700.  Hud.gov, FY 2009 Median Family Income Documentation System, 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/il/il2009/st_mfi.odb (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) (select “District 
of Columbia-DC” from dropdown menu). 
 114. During the first three decades of its program, Montgomery County controlled the prices 
of its inclusionary units for only a short period, sometimes as little as five or ten years.  By 2002, at 
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rents that the developer/owner is permitted to charge in subsequent years 
are set according to a formula that is entirely based on other variables.115  Some 
long-term occupants of the county’s inclusionary units are therefore virtually 
certain to have annual incomes in excess of $100,000.  Indeed, between 2005 
and 2007, because of quirks in the design of the county’s program, a handful 
of developers were entitled to sell inclusionary units at the controlled price 
to purchasers of any income.116 
Montgomery County has periodically released additional information about 
program beneficiaries that is pertinent to equity issues.  According to one report, 
95 percent of the recipients of the county’s inclusionary units already lived 
in the county, and all but one of the remaining recipients worked there.117  Fur-
thermore, a majority of the initial occupants of the inclusionary units have 
been members of racial minority groups.118  In the years for which data are 
available, Asian Americans, who make up 11 percent of the county’s popula-
tion, have comprised 40 percent of the initial occupants.119 
Many of the relevant interest groups prefer that an inclusionary zoning 
ordinance have the middle-class tilt that characterizes the Montgomery County 
program.  Developers tend to favor inclusionary tenants who are likely to be 
both steady in their rent payments and socially acceptable to the households 
that occupy the unsubsidized units in the same development.  Middle-income 
people who own homes near a proposed inclusionary project also are likely to 
prefer that it be relatively upscale.  In a prosperous suburb such as Montgomery 
County, taxpayers and members of municipal labor unions may warm to a 
developer-financed program that confers inclusionary units on some of the 
                                                                                                                            
least one-third of the exacted units had already been freed from price controls and were no longer 
providing subsidized accommodations.  ARON TROMBKA ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE MODERATELY 
PRICED DWELLING UNIT PROGRAM: A 30-YEAR REVIEW, REPORT TO THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
COUNCIL  6-1, 7-1 (2004), available at http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/council.  A majority 
of the county’s for-sale inclusionary units nevertheless remain in its affordable stock.  Porter, supra 
note 38, at 238.  Since 1989, even after the expiration of the control period, the county has exacted 
half of an owner’s excess proceeds from a sale, a policy that has discouraged sales.  In addition, the 
county has a right of first refusal at the time of sale.  The county’s housing agency (HOC) has 
purchased 1600 of the for-sale units over the years and has then rented them to households with 
incomes below 50 percent of area median income.  Because the county could empower its housing 
agency to purchase scattered-site units in non-inclusionary developments, I credit this tilt toward 
greater vertical equity to the housing agency’s purchasing efforts, not to the county’s inclusionary 
zoning program as such. 
 115. RUBIN & TROMBKA, supra note 109, at 41–43. 
 116. Id. at 48–49. 
 117. Porter, supra note 38, at 243. 
 118. Florence Wagman Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration: Lessons for the 21st 
Century, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 65, 79 n.81 (2001). 
 119. Porter, supra note 38, at 243. 
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suburb’s employees, including college-educated professionals such as school 
teachers and librarians.  Although a politically popular result, this is hardly a 
triumph of Rawlsian justice. 
III. METHODS OF PROMOTING THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
OF NEIGHBORHOODS 
By definition, mixed-income housing programs are designed to enhance 
the residential integration of households with disparate incomes.  Given the 
relative poverty of many African Americans and Hispanic Americans, efforts 
to promote economic integration can also be expected to contribute to greater 
racial integration.120  Because the United States is a highly diverse nation, 
Americans unquestionably have reason to encourage bridging across social 
groups that might otherwise tend to be isolated from one another.  The analysis 
in this Part rests on the premise that the successful economic integration of 
neighborhoods is a goal of transcendent importance; it concludes, however, 
that, from what we now know, the mixed-income project model is a mediocre 
instrument for pursing that goal.  The next Part turns to the more fundamental 
question of whether, in the design of housing assistance policies, the greater 
economic integration of neighborhoods should be regarded as the summum 
bonum. 
A. Are Projects Promising Microcosms for Economic Integration? 
A mixed-income affordable project, such as our hypothetical Evergreen 
Woods, is designed to promote greater economic (and perhaps racial) integration 
at the level of the residential block.  But it is not evident that a geographic space 
this small is a promising venue for the pursuit of this goal.  In Bowling Alone, 
Robert Putnam famously distinguishes between two types of valuable social 
capital.121  Bonding social capital promotes trust and cooperation among the 
members of a social subgroup, while bridging social capital strengthens ties 
between members of different subgroups.  Over the course of a day, most indi-
viduals rotate through a variety of different (but commonly overlapping) social 
milieus in which both bonding and bridging may be achievable.  For a child, 
the residential block is likely to be a less important social microcosm than the 
household and the school.  For an adult, workmates, family, and friends are likely 
                                                                                                                            
 120. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, tbl.674.  Partly because of statutory and constitutional 
constraints, virtually all housing assistance programs are officially race-blind.  My analysis assumes 
that they indeed are administered in race-blind fashion. 
 121. PUTNAM, supra note 90, at 22–24. 
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to be more important than neighbors.  Nonetheless, blocks unquestionably can 
be sites for the nurturing of both bonding and bridging social ties. 
There is substantial evidence that in some social contexts the enhance-
ment of opportunities for bridging among members of different social groups 
simultaneously diminishes internal bonding among members of an individual 
group.122  If so, those who want to strengthen social capital in the aggregate 
face a dilemma.  Bonding social capital unquestionably is valuable at the 
block level because it helps enable neighbors to, for example, provide mutual aid 
and informally police against nuisance behavior.  Enhanced integration of 
socioeconomic groups within a given block or blockfront, although it might 
enhance bridging social capital, possibly might impair this sort of cooperation 
among neighbors.123 
The choice of the optimal social milieu for the pursuit of economic inte-
gration therefore is a difficult one.  The New Jersey Supreme Court, in its two 
famous Mount Laurel decisions, flip-flopped on this exact question.  The author 
of Mount Laurel I124 was Justice Frederick Hall, an archfoe of exclusionary 
zoning.  Justice Hall’s opinion, however, only required municipalities to allow 
for an appropriate variety of housing at selected locations within their bounda-
ries and explicitly blessed the use of zoning to set aside some neighborhoods 
as exclusive.125  To oversimplify, Justice Hall’s opinion sought to promote eco-
nomic integration at the geographic scale of the local public high school, not 
that of the block.  Eight years later, in Mount Laurel II,126 a revamped New Jersey 
Supreme Court reversed course and prodded municipalities to promote the 
provision of inclusionary housing units within each new housing development.127 
Much remains to be learned about the trade-offs between bonding and 
bridging social capital in different social milieus.  From what is now known, 
there are grounds for skepticism about the capacity of a mixed-income housing 
                                                                                                                            
 122. Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, 
30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137 (2007). 
 123. In theory, positive and negative social consequences should be at least partially capitalized 
into housing prices.  To my knowledge, there have been no published studies of whether inclusionary 
units in a mixed-income development affect the market values of the same development’s unsubsidized 
units.  Numerous researchers, however, have striven to measure the effects of the construction of a 
subsidized housing project or the entry of Section 8 tenants on property values in a neighborhood.  
See George C. Galster, The Effects of Affordable and Multifamily Housing on Market Values of Nearby 
Homes, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 176 
(Anthony Downs ed., 2004) (reviewing various studies), and sources cited supra note 80. 
 124. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 
(N.J. 1975).  
 125. Id. at 731–34. 
 126. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 
(N.J. 1983). 
 127. Id. at 445–50. 
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project to enhance the aggregate stock of social capital.128  The authors of the 
most-cited empirical study on the subject conclude that “the level of interac-
tion between the income groups in [mixed-income] projects appears to be 
insignificant.”129  Other housing experts have cautioned that the mixed-income 
model rests on sociological assumptions that may not be valid.130  In addition, 
sociological theory suggests that members of lower-income households them-
selves might dislike the social environment of an inclusionary development.  
Individuals tend to care a lot about their relative status in a given social 
setting.131  Whatever the other benefits of living in Evergreen Woods, the adults 
and children in the ten affordable units (assuming they would socialize with 
their neighbors) might be frustrated by their difficulty in keeping up with the 
Joneses who occupy the other forty units. 
B. Vouchers as an Instrument for Promoting Neighborhood 
Economic Integration 
Assuming that the greater economic integration of neighborhoods is indeed 
an overriding policy objective, what housing assistance policies would best 
promote this end?  For many observers, the main shortcoming of Section 8 
vouchers is that they do not do enough to enhance the racial integration of 
neighborhoods.132  Many users of housing vouchers live in areas where people 
like themselves predominate.133  For example, a poor black tenant who holds a 
housing voucher commonly ends up renting in a largely poor, largely black 
neighborhood.  Nonetheless, numerous researchers have found that, as a gen-
eral matter, housing vouchers have done more than project-based subsidies to 
                                                                                                                            
 128. This statement assumes, for simplicity, that “units” of bonding and bridging social capital are 
equal in social value.  In a social environment particularly lacking in one type of social capital but not 
the other, units of the type in short supply might be regarded as more valuable than units of the other. 
 129. Paul C. Brophy & Rhonda N. Smith, Mixed-Income Housing: Factors for Success, CITYSCAPE: 
J. POL’Y DEV. & RES., 1997 No. 2, at  3, 25. 
 130. One commentator, after reviewing the evidence, urges HUD to concentrate on integrating 
neighborhoods, not particular projects.  Cara Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcen-
tration in Public Housing, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 35, 70–81 (2002); see also SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 8, at 261–67.  Schwartz concludes that “the limited research to date on mixed-income housing 
has yet to show that the presence of higher income neighbors by itself improves the economic or social 
condition of low-income families (e.g., by providing role models, job leads).”  Id. at 266. 
 131. ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST 
FOR STATUS (1987). 
 132. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 175; James DeFilippis & Elvin Wyly, Running to 
Stand Still: Through the Looking Glass With Federally Subsidized Housing in New York City, 43 URB. 
AFF. REV. 777 (2008). 
 133. Lan Deng, Comparing the Effects of Housing Vouchers and Low-Income Housing Tax Credits 
on Neighborhood Integration and School Quality, 27 J. PLANNING EDUC. & RES. 20 (2007). 
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enhance the economic integration of neighborhoods.  A voucher holder is far 
less likely than a resident of public housing and somewhat less likely than a 
resident of a privately owned subsidized project to live in a neighborhood 
with a high rate of poverty.134  When subsidized tenants are asked whether their 
current neighborhood is better or worse than their previous one, 45 percent 
of voucher holders answer better and 12 percent answer worse.135  By contrast, 
in both public and private subsidized projects, the number of tenants answering 
worse exceeds the number answering better.136  In most metropolitan areas, 
vouchers appear also to have done more than LIHTC projects to promote 
neighborhood racial integration.137 
The studies just cited, however, mainly examined the integrative effects 
of projects in which all units, not just some, were subsidized.  Mixed-income 
projects conceivably could foster economic integration better than could 
housing vouchers, especially at the block level.  The available evidence on this 
important question, however, is less favorable to the mixed-income project 
than one might expect.  As noted, the recipients of many inclusionary housing 
units are themselves middle-class suburbanites.  But even in instances where 
there is actual economic integration in a mixed-income project, the subsidized 
tenants might be stigmatized in a manner that would impair the devel-
opment of bridging relationships between members of different income groups.  
Neighbors commonly know when a new development encompasses inclusionary 
units, and the residents of a mixed-income development may learn which units 
have subsidies tied to them.  Vouchers are potentially more discreet.  If both 
the landlord and the tenant avoid spilling the beans, the holder of a housing 
voucher can move into a more prosperous neighborhood incognito.  The relative 
invisibility of a voucher promises to help normalize a voucher holder’s future 
relationships with neighbors. 
                                                                                                                            
 134. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 160–66; Deng, supra note 133, at 22; Jeffrey R. Kling et 
al., Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects, 75 ECONOMETRICA 83, 87–88 (2007); Sandra J. 
Newman & Ann B. Schnare, “ . . . And a Suitable Living Environment”: The Failure of Housing 
Programs to Deliver on Neighborhood Quality, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 703 (1997); Olsen, supra 
note 4, at 393, 407–11.  But cf. DeFilippis & Wyly, supra note 132. 
Federal law entitles a voucher holder to lease a rental unit outside the boundaries of the jurisdic-
tion that granted the voucher.  This portability rule gives rise to complications and, in some instances, 
resistance on the part of suburban jurisdictions.  See JUDITH D. FEINS ET AL., STATE AND METROPOLITAN 
ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 8: CURRENT MODELS AND POTENTIAL RESOURCES  (1996) (report 
prepared for U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development). 
 135. DUANE T. MCGOUGH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., CHARACTERISTICS OF HUD-
ASSISTED RENTERS AND THEIR UNITS IN 1993, at 30 (1997). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Deng, supra note 133, at 27–28. 
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If the economic integration of neighborhoods is the paramount social 
objective, lawmakers could shape the rules governing existing forms of hous-
ing assistance with this goal in mind.  But Congress no doubt would hear howls 
of protest if it were to consider mandating that all new public housing or LIHTC 
projects be scattered outside of poor neighborhoods.  Because vouchers are rela-
tively invisible, Section 8 is the more potent instrument for the affirmative 
promotion of economic integration.  Some local housing authorities already 
provide counseling services to help voucher holders find apartments.138  Several 
states forbid a landlord from discriminating against a tenant on the basis of the 
tenant’s sources of income.139  More pointedly, Congress could adjust the formu-
las for calculating voucher benefits in order to encourage poor voucher 
holders to choose to rent in more prosperous neighborhoods.  To foster this sort 
of outcome, small financial bonuses could be provided, for example, to both 
the tenant and the landlord whose efforts combine to bring it about. 
IV. RISING DOUBTS ABOUT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE BENEFITS  
OF NEIGHBORHOOD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Urban commentators have widely assumed that, all else equal, it is highly 
disadvantageous for poor adults and children to reside in a poor neighborhood.140  
This premise underpinned many of the integrationist visions that flowered in 
the 1960s.  It eventually inspired, among many other byproducts, the mixed-
income subsidized housing model.141  Prominent sociologists closely associated 
with this traditional position include William Julius Wilson and, more recently, 
Robert Sampson.142  According to this view, economic integration is likely to 
                                                                                                                            
 138. Sean Zielenbach, Moving Beyond the Rhetoric: Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program 
and Lower-Income Urban Neighborhoods, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 9, 
31 (2006) (reporting mobility counseling in Philadelphia). 
 139. See, e.g., Franklin Tower One, L.L.C., v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104 (N.J. 1999). 
 140. For an overview of issues of neighborhood integration, see EDWARD G. GOETZ, CLEARING 
THE WAY: DECONCENTRATING THE POOR IN URBAN AMERICA (2003). 
 141. See Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons From Chicago’s 
Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 117, 154–60 (2009) (describing 
how housing reformers, not public housing residents themselves, pushed the mixed-income model 
in Chicago). 
 142. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); Robert J. Sampson et al., Durable Effects of Concentrated 
Disadvantage on Verbal Ability Among African-American Children, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 845 
(2008).  Sampson and his co-authors note the importance and difficulty of controlling for the 
possibility that households that move out of a neighborhood with concentrated poverty differ from 
households that remain. 
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have a variety of beneficial consequences.143  A poor schoolchild is more likely 
to encounter helpful peers and adult role models at local public schools.  A 
poor adult who resides near more prosperous neighbors is more likely to hear of 
job opportunities through informal social networks.  Scenarios such as these 
have kindled support for policies to “dismantle the ghetto”144 and economically 
integrate subsidized housing projects previously occupied exclusively by the 
very poor.145  Initial studies of the effects of one such effort, the Gautreaux 
program in Chicago, appeared to confirm that moving to a more prosperous 
neighborhood significantly improves a child’s schooling and employment 
outcomes.146 
Most housing policy specialists rightly seek to end the ghettoization of 
poor households in mammoth subsidized housing projects.147  When poor 
households are clustered in a neighborhood of conventional private housing, 
however, it is hardly so clear that policymakers should seek to disperse the 
concentration.  Recently published studies have begun to destabilize the for-
mer consensus that a poor adult or child is significantly disadvantaged by 
residing among other poor people.  These studies suggest that the net social 
benefits of the economic and racial integration of neighborhoods, while 
probably still positive, are not as large as previously thought. 
The HUD-funded Moving to Opportunity (MTO) studies have been the 
most influential, largely because of the magnitude of the MTO experiment and 
the high quality of the research design.148  The households participating in MTO 
                                                                                                                            
 143. See generally Ingrid Gould Ellen & Margery Austin Turner, Does Neighborhood Matter? 
Assessing Recent Evidence, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 833 (2001).  
 144. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 15, 218 (1993). 
 145. The pertinent literature primarily focuses on the integration of entire neighborhoods, not of 
individual blocks (what a mixed-income project seeks to integrate).  The social dynamics of neighborhoods 
and blocks obviously may differ. 
 146. See, e.g., LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND 
COLOR LINES (2000).  For concerns about the methodologies used in the Gautreaux studies, see 
CURRIE, supra note 12, at 103–04, and SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 169–70. 
 147. See, e.g., Schill, supra note 22.  But cf. Brian A. Jacob, Public Housing, Housing Vouchers 
and Student Achievement: Evidence From Public Housing Demolitions in Chicago, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 
233 (2004) (finding that living in a high-rise public housing project does not by itself impair the 
educational outcomes of children). 
 148. The findings of the MTO studies are summarized in Kling et al., supra note 134.  The first 
published MTO studies reported greater positive benefits from economic integration.  See, e.g., 
CHOOSING A BETTER LIFE?  EVALUATING THE MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY SOCIAL EXPERIMENT (John 
Goering & Judith D. Feins eds., 2003).  In particular, Jens Ludwig et al., The Effects of MTO on Children 
and Parents in Baltimore, id. at 153, found that poor children aged five to twelve had better educational 
outcomes when their parents moved them to higher-income neighborhoods.  But a later study concluded 
that MTO data indicated that neighborhood effects on educational outcomes are small.  Lisa 
Sanbonmatsu et al., Neighborhoods and Academic Achievement: Results From the Moving to Opportunity 
Experiment, 41 J. HUM. RESOURCES 649 (2006). 
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were volunteers who at the outset were residing in public housing projects in 
Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, or New York.  Most were both 
poor and members of minority groups.  These households were randomly 
divided into three groups: a control group whose members remained in their 
public housing units; a constrained housing voucher group that was awarded 
vouchers but could use them only in a low-poverty neighborhood; and an 
unconstrained housing voucher group that was not limited by neighbor-
hood.  Most households in the last group used their vouchers to rent dwelling 
units in high-poverty, mostly minority neighborhoods.  Those in the constrained 
voucher group, the primary focus of the experiment, mostly chose to move to 
relatively prosperous neighborhoods that also were predominantly minority.  
Four to seven years later, researchers assessed the outcomes for teenagers and 
adults.  According to the traditional view, the outcomes of children in the 
constrained voucher group—the beneficiaries of neighborhood economic 
integration—should have been significantly superior to the outcomes for the 
children in the other two groups.  This proved to be true for teenage girls.149  
For teenage boys, however, living in a more prosperous neighborhood generally 
turned out to be disadvantageous, to roughly the same extent that it had been 
advantageous for girls.150  These boys, perhaps because their parents had moved 
them to what they regarded to be a “wrong pond,” were significantly more likely 
than the boys in the other two groups to use drugs and alcohol and to be 
arrested for a property crime.  The adults in the MTO experiment who moved 
to low-poverty neighborhoods showed gains in mental health, but not in 
employment, physical health, and freedom from welfare dependence.151 
Also pertinent is a recent study by Robert Putnam, the most prominent 
analyst of social capital.152  After reviewing the vast literature on the conse-
quences of the integration of neighborhoods, particularly by race and ethnicity, 
Putnam comes to sobering conclusions.  He asserts that residents of diverse 
neighborhoods have less social capital than do residents of more homogene-
ous neighborhoods.153  Moreover, the members of an ethnic group who live in 
a relatively integrated neighborhood are likely to have weaker ties to other 
members of their own ethnic group than they would if they lived in an ethnic 
enclave.154  Putnam affirms his support for integration, but he is compelled 
                                                                                                                            
 149. Kling et al., supra note 134, at 103; Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 148, at 678–79. 
 150. Kling et al., supra note 134, at 105; Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 148, at 678–82. 
 151. But cf. David M Cutler et al., When are Ghettos Bad?  Lessons From Immigrant Segregation 
in the United States, 63 J. URB. ECON. 759 (2008) (finding that although ghettoization on average may 
help some immigrants in U.S. cities, it is detrimental to poor immigrants). 
 152. Putnam, supra note 122. 
 153. Id. at 149–51, 156. 
 154. Id. at 148–51. 
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by his findings to shift his emphasis to the long-term benefits of neighborhood 
diversity.155 
Other less-publicized studies similarly cast doubt on the traditional view 
that economic integration gives rise to significant social benefits.  Philip 
Oreopoulos finds that growing up in a poor neighborhood does not by itself lead 
to worse outcomes for children.156  His results indicate that a child’s household 
environment has a far greater effect than a child’s neighborhood environment. 
Various studies on residential preferences suggest that most poor minority 
households do not warm to the prospect of moving to wealthier white 
neighborhoods.  For example, most African Americans state in surveys that 
they prefer to live in a neighborhood that is mostly African American.157  
Some of these responses may stem from concerns that nonblack neighbors 
might discriminate against blacks.  There is recent econometric evidence, 
however, that many African Americans are positively attracted to living in 
a mostly black neighborhood.158  An affirmative taste for stratifying by social 
class also seems to be widespread, even among members of lower-status groups.  
Individuals who have not graduated from college, for example, seem to be willing 
to pay a premium to live in a neighborhood that is not mostly inhabited by 
college graduates.159 
The revisionist thesis that poor people garner no more than modest 
benefits from living in a neighborhood that is not poor is consistent with 
the residential choices that most poor people make.  As noted, poor minor-
ity households that hold housing vouchers tend to end up renting in mostly 
poor, mostly minority neighborhoods.  This would be less common, no doubt, 
if more landlords in prosperous neighborhoods were willing to participate in 
Section 8 and if voucher holders were unconcerned about how warmly they 
would be received by their new neighbors.  The revisionist works just cited 
suggest, however, that most voucher holders may affirmatively prefer to live 
                                                                                                                            
 155. Id. at 163–65. 
 156. Philip Oreopoulos, The Long-Run Consequences of Living in a Poor Neighborhood, 118 Q. 
J. ECON. 1533 (2003). 
 157. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post-
Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan Areas, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 737 (2001) (citing Reynolds Farley 
et al., Continued Residential Segregation in Detroit: “Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs” Revisited, 4 J. HOUSING 
RES. 1 (1993)). 
 158. Patrick Bayer et al., Separate When Equal?: Racial Inequality and Residential Segregation (Yale 
Working Papers on Econ. Applications and Policy, Discussion Paper No. 09, Oct. 2005). 
 159. Patrick Bayer et al., A Unified Framework for Measuring Preferences for Schools and 
Neighborhoods, 115 J. POL. ECON. 588, 626 (2007).  For anecdotal support, see MARY PATILLO, BLACK 
ON THE BLOCK: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE CITY 297–99 (2007) (recounting how a 
poor black woman resented that a wealthier black neighbor “looked down on” her). 
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amidst people like themselves.160  Some mayors have learned this lesson the 
hard way.  In the 1950s, many cities used the power of eminent domain to raze 
entire poor neighborhoods, such as Southwest Washington, D.C., and Boston’s 
West End.161  City officials rarely attempt this today, partly because they are 
aware that many impoverished residents value their neighborhoods and would 
rush to poverty lawyers in an effort to stave off the bulldozer.162 
The studies on neighborhood integration just mentioned are hardly the 
final word on this complex social issue.  Like most commentators, I welcome 
the prospect of increased residential integration by race and income, espe-
cially within a territory the size of a high school district, a plausible social milieu 
for fostering bridging social capital.  Mixed-income housing projects attempt, 
however, to promote integration at the fine-grained level of the block, a venue in 
which the nurturing of bonding social capital plausibly should be given higher 
priority.163  Taken as a whole, the recent social scientific findings suggest that 
the social benefits of mixed-income projects are unlikely to outweigh the 
inherent inefficiency and unfairness of the approach.164 
V. WHY SUPPORT FOR PROJECT-BASED SUBSIDIES PERSISTS 
Financial interests and antimarket ideologies spur much of the support for 
the production of subsidized housing projects, mixed-income or otherwise.  A 
government program that annually dispenses billions of dollars—whether for the 
production of ethanol, submarines, or affordable housing—brings into existence 
constituencies whose members then provide continuing political support for 
the program.  Many housing advocates are connected to organizations whose 
revenues depend on the continued development of affordable projects.  Organi-
zations of this stripe have created the National Low Income Housing Coalition, 
which is spearheading the effort to make the nascent National Housing Trust 
Fund a functioning entity.  In the early 1990s, Paul Grogan, the president of 
one of the nation’s largest syndicators of LIHTCs, lobbied fervently and suc-
                                                                                                                            
 160. See also GOETZ, supra note 140, at 241. 
 161. See HOWARD GILLETTE, JR., BETWEEN JUSTICE AND BEAUTY: RACE PLANNING AND 
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cessfully to make the LIHTC program permanent.165  Attorneys who specialize 
in the development of affordable housing projects have created a 3000-
member American Bar Association group that publishes a journal and holds 
annual conferences.166  The unions that represent the construction trades tend to 
favor project subsidies not only because construction projects employ their mem-
bers but also because a legislature may be amenable to dictating that project 
developers pay “prevailing wages.”167  In suburbs where the supply of housing 
is inelastic, the imposition of inclusionary housing exactions on developers 
may boost the value of both new and existing houses.168  Federal, state, and local 
politicians all have learned that having the power to influence project approv-
als can provide leverage to raise campaign contributions.  It is hardly news that 
HUD’s project programs have frequently been rocked by scandal.169 
Ideological commitments have primarily motivated some boosters of 
subsidized projects.  Edith Wood, the most prominent early proponent of U.S. 
projects, had scorn for the outcomes produced by the forces of supply and 
demand.170  Chester Hartman, for decades one of the most prominent critics of 
housing vouchers, favors scrapping the market system of housing supply and 
replacing it with a new system in which nonprofit entities, supported by gov-
ernment grants covering all capital costs, would provide housing at one-third 
of current market rents.171  Yet these advocates of bricks-and-mortar solutions 
to the affordable housing problem tend to underappreciate the subtleties of 
                                                                                                                            
 165. See, e.g., Paul Grogan, Op-Ed, Points of Urban Light, WASH. POST, July 19, 1992, at C3.  
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(1992); Tad DeHaven, Three Decades of Politics and Failed Policies at HUD (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis 
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URBAN PLANNING 248 (2002). 
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housing markets.  An infusion of portable vouchers into a city boosts both the 
quality and quantity of housing supply because the rise in demand helps 
induce landlords to upgrade their buildings to attract tenants.172  Conversely, 
an infusion of subsidized projects adds less than might be expected to the 
total housing stock because it tends to displace private production that would 
otherwise occur.173  Those who rank project subsidies above vouchers tend to 
ignore these secondary effects. 
The report of the Bipartisan Millennial Housing Commission evinces 
a similar lack of confidence in housing markets.  Perceiving a “shrinking rental 
supply,” the commission advocates massive government aid to add at least five 
million designated affordable units to the housing stock.174  In the process 
of pressing for this solution, the commission’s report refers to statistics that 
show that there were actually 3.2 million more rental housing units than 
renting households in the United States in 1999.175  The report claims that 
“vouchers alone will not be enough in housing markets where the supply is 
inadequate or to provide housing opportunities in areas with fast-growing 
employment.”176  The commission, however, failed to name any specific met-
ropolitan area where it deemed these conditions to prevail.  In 2002, the year of 
the commission’s report, the vacancy rate for rental units in the seventy-five 
largest metropolitan areas was 8.8 percent, and it exceeded 14 percent in the 
fast-growing metropolitan areas of Atlanta, Phoenix, and San Antonio.177  
In contrast, in metropolitan Boston, New York, and San Francisco—centers 
of efforts to produce mixed-income housing projects—the vacancy rate for 
rental units in 2002 was about half the national average.178  In virtually all 
metropolitan areas, reducing barriers to unsubsidized housing production and 
providing rent-burdened households with additional funds to help them choose 
                                                                                                                            
 172. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 107–08; Todd Sinai & Joel Waldfogel, Do Low-Income Housing 
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among existing dwellings would be far more efficient and fairer than 
ramping up construction of units set aside as sites for subsidies.179 
Nevertheless, the political prospects of a shift to an all-voucher strategy 
are dim.180  Critics of vouchers deploy a predictable litany of objections.  
Those on the left assert that vouchers mostly inflate rents and that a large 
fraction of voucher holders will end up not being able to find housing.  Those 
on the right claim that vouchers overly destabilize neighborhoods.181  On 
balance, the wealth of evidence on all these issues indicates that the 
concerns are overblown.182  Nonetheless, members of Congress feel little pres-
sure to convert project-based housing aid to tenant-based aid.  The staunchest 
supporters of project-based subsidies, while not numerous, are sophisticated and 
well organized.  The millions of poor households who would be the primary 
beneficiaries of an expanded voucher program are diffuse and not mobilized.  
Enough said. 
CONCLUSION: THE MEDIOCRITY OF THE MIXED-INCOME 
HOUSING PROJECT 
Mixed-income affordable housing projects are unquestionably superior 
to the large ghettoized public housing structures that until recently blighted 
the most populous American cities.  While the process of developing a mixed-
income project is likely to give rise to more red tape per subsidized unit, a private 
mixed-income project is likely to endure longer than a public housing project 
and to be better managed and less socially troubled. 
Nonetheless, building mixed-income subsidized projects is a mediocre pol-
icy approach.  In most contexts, using tax revenues to enhance spending on 
housing vouchers would be far more efficient and fairer than devoting those 
same revenues to providing inclusionary units.  Although hardly problem-free, 
vouchers confer greater benefits on recipients and avoid many of the pitfalls 
                                                                                                                            
 179. See GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 8, at 119–36; WEICHER, supra note 25, at 27–28. 
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of project-based aid.183  Experience indicates that the mixed-income project 
approach is far more flawed.  It has blossomed primarily on account of the 
political influence of those who gain from supplying these developments.  
That a return to the traditional public housing model would be worse yet 
hardly establishes an affirmative case for the mixed-income model. 
Some specific indictments are in order.  One mediocre federal program 
is HOPE VI, a vehicle for razing a failed public housing project (a good idea) 
and replacing it, commonly at extraordinarily high cost, with a new mixed-
income development (a bad idea).184  Another is the Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit, the program of federal aid that now encompasses a greater number 
of dwelling units than the entire stock of public housing.185  Yet another is 
the nascent National Housing Trust Fund—the favorite of many housing 
advocates—that Congress nominally established in 2008.186 
The critique also calls into question the wisdom of city and state 
inclusionary programs that require developers of market-rate housing to provide 
either affordable units or in-lieu fees to finance others’ development of mixed-
income projects.  These inclusionary policies, like the federal programs just 
identified, are mediocre in the sense that the resources devoted to them would 
be far better allocated otherwise.  The exaction of inclusionary housing from 
developers first began in the 1970s.  By 2003 the various inclusionary programs 
had generated, nationwide, on the order of 90,000 new subsidized housing 
units, less than 0.1 percent of the national housing stock.187  The exaction of 
inclusionary housing is most prevalent in states where housing is exception-
ally expensive, such as California, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.  
Both theory and evidence suggest that so-called “inclusionary” policies have 
actually contributed to the high cost of housing in these jurisdictions.188  And it 
is undisputed that these same states, and their municipalities, impose unusually 
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severe legal constraints on housing supply.189  Collectively, their perverse policies 
include exclusionary zoning practices, strict growth controls, and complex 
environmental reporting requirements that enable opponents to delay (and 
sometimes derail) proposed housing developments.190 
The allure of the mixed-income project has entranced too many housing 
advocates active in California, Massachusetts, and the other exclusionary 
states.  Those who genuinely wish to help poor households would be wiser to 
devote their efforts to documenting and publicizing their states’ unjustified 
constraints on housing supply and to supporting legislation to lower those 
barriers.191  These reforms, coupled with more extensive use of vouchers, would 
render vastly greater benefits to low-income people who lack decent and afford-
able housing.  The mixed-income project strategy is a far less efficient and a far 
less equitable means to that noble end.  
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